Increasing the Security of Weak Passwords: the SPARTAN Interface by Helble, Sarah C. et al.
Increasing the Security of Weak Passwords: the
SPARTAN Interface
Sarah C. Helble, Alexander J. Gartner, Jennifer A. McKneely
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
firstname.lastname@jhuapl.edu
Abstract—Password authentication suffers from the well-
known tradeoff between security and usability. Secure passwords
are difficult for users to remember, and memorable passwords
are often easy to guess. SPARse Two-dimensional AuthenticatioN
(SPARTAN) allows users to input their textual passwords in a
two-dimensional grid instead of a linear textbox. This interface
enables relatively short passwords to have a higher calculated
level of security due to the need for an attacker to determine both
the text of the password and the location of each character in the
grid. We created a SPARTAN prototype and conducted a prelim-
inary user study to evaluate the actual usability and security of
the SPARTAN interface compared to the linear password entry
interface. We find that while user-created SPARTAN passwords
tend to be shorter than their linear counterparts, the calculated
security of user-created SPARTAN passwords is higher than that
of user-created linear passwords. We also asked participants to
complete a survey on the usability of the SPARTAN interface and
identified some areas of improvement, while prototype interaction
provided some evidence of users becoming more familiar with
SPARTAN over time. Finally, we performed an investigation into
password-cracking tools, and assert that SPARTAN passwords
require more resources to crack than their linear counterparts.
These findings suggest that SPARTAN is a promising alternative
to linear passwords from a security standpoint. Usability of
the interface and memorability of SPARTAN passwords is an
interesting research question and should be further investigated
in future work.
I. INTRODUCTION
Password authentication is in many ways both a blessing
and a curse for modern computer systems and applications
and their users. Although many researchers and users would
enjoy the riddance of password authentication in their daily
lives, the relative ease of deployment and usability of password
authentication shows that passwords are here to stay for the
foreseeable future [1][2]. However, when given the freedom
to choose their own passwords, many users will opt to create
passwords that are easy for an adversary to guess or easy for
a password recovery tool to crack [3]. Users can be trained or
given tools and guidelines to aid in the creation of more secure
passwords. However, studies have found that most users will
actively try to circumvent these requirements in order to create
a password they are able to remember [4].
This paper presents SPARse Two-dimensional Authentica-
tioN (SPARTAN), a password entry interface that attempts
to bridge the gap between security and usability. SPARTAN
allows a user to input each character of his password anywhere
in a two-dimensional grid instead of a linear textbox. Even
with sparsely-populated grids, SPARTAN passwords increase
entropy over linear passwords due to the variability of the
location of each character. In this way, users can have simpler
passwords while achieving a higher overall password security.
As prior work with SPARTAN has been largely theorectical,
we conducted a preliminary study to test the usability and
security of the SPARTAN interface with unfamiliar users. Our
study was especially concerned with the time required for
users to create a password using our interface, and the resulting
security of the password created both in terms of calculated
security (i.e., entropy) and security against a stolen password
file attack. The study reached a total of 100 participants, 48 of
which interacted with the SPARTAN prototype. The remaining
52 participants formed a control group and were asked to
perform tasks on a linear password interface. We found
that while passwords created with the SPARTAN interface
were, on average, shorter and comprising fewer character sets
than passwords created with the linear interface, SPARTAN
users did choose a variety of starting positions and password
formations, which resulted in a higher average security for
SPARTAN passwords compared to their linear conterparts.
Feedback on the SPARTAN prototype mixed excitement and
criticism, and the current prototype needs further evaluation
and focused usability development before use in an operational
environment.
The next section goes into more detail about SPARTAN,
while Section III discusses related work in usable password
authentication. Section IV explains the methodology of our
user study and the functionality of the SPARTAN prototype
interface created for this study. Our findings are presented in
Sections V and VI, while Section VII gives a more academic
discussion of the calculated security of user-created SPARTAN
passwords. Finally, Section VIII explains future work that we
wish to perform to further evaluate SPARTAN and concludes.
II. SPARTAN
The SPARTAN interface allows the user to input their
password anywhere in a two-dimensional grid. The user’s
SPARTAN password is then the text of the password itself
and the location of each character in the grid. Figure 1
gives examples of various types of SPARTAN passwords
users could create. As its name implies, SPARTAN grids are
sparsely populated, that is, the whole grid does not need to
be filled with characters in order to see a security benefit over
linear passwords. Table I compares the password space for
8-character linear passwords and SPARTAN passwords.
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Fig. 1. Different categories of SPARTAN passwords. A Straight Line
password continues in a single straight line through the grid. A Snake
password changes direction as it flows through the grid, but always continues
into an adjacent cell. A Block password fills a square or rectangle pattern
in the grid, likely following the coloring scheme. A Segments password is a
Straight Line password composed of multiple segments, and a Points password
is made up of multiple disjoint points throughout the grid.
Password type Password Space
Linear 41 bits
SPARTAN 12x12 grid 98 bits
TABLE I
PASSWORD SPACE OF RANDOM LINEAR PASSWORDS OF 8 CHARACTERS
AND RANDOM SPARTAN PASSWORDS OF THE SAME LENGTH, USING AN
ALPHABET OF 36 CHARACTERS. FOR LINEAR PASSWORDS, THE EQUATION
USED IS log2(368). FOR SPARTAN PASSWORDS, THIS IS
log((368) ∗ (P (12 ∗ 12, 8)))
To use SPARTAN, the user first selects a starting location.
In deployment scenarios, this cell could be randomly chosen
or otherwise constrained to help the user select a unique
placement. There is no requirement for the characters of a
password to be placed in adjacent cells. In fact, SPARTAN
passwords are most secure when the user chooses distinct
points throughout the grid. However, to aid ease of input, our
implementations give the user the option to select a direction
for their password. Direction can be changed during password
entry; the prototype will automatically place typed characters
into adjacent cells in the selected direction. Order of character
entry is not collected as part of the password, but SPARTAN
does not preclude this.
The grid used for SPARTAN passwords can be as large or as
small as necessary to balance desired usability and security.
Optimal grid size is an interesting area of future work we
wish to pursue in a follow-on user study. In our prototypes, the
squares of the SPARTAN grid have been colored in an abstract
pattern in an attempt to limit the prevalance of hotspots in
the grid, and to help users remember the placement of their
passwords. This colorization is merely a visual aid provided
by the interface; it is not chosen by the user as part of their
password. Colorization would be different across accounts,
so it could also aid users in remembering multiple different
SPARTAN passwords.
The SPARTAN grid also employs a wrapping mechanism so
that the user does not have to estimate spacing before creating
his password. In our implementations this mechanism can
result in the overwriting of characters. Future implementations
could fix this by allowing multiple characters to reside in
a single cell. The encoding of the SPARTAN password is
an implementation decision, and can be any method which
preserves each character of the password and its location. One
method could be to encode the password as follows:
23P24a25s26s36w46o56r57d
Where the initial ’23’ is location of the ’P’ in the grid,
’24’ is the location of the ’a’, and so forth. The encoded
password can then be hashed and stored in the same way as
linear passwords.
A. Deployment Options
The SPARTAN interface can be used anywhere that linear
passwords are used, including as part of a two-factor authen-
tication scheme. We have developed a JavaScript SPARTAN
interface, which can be incorporated into any existing web-
based login page. We have also created a SPARTAN user script
which can be deployed client-side, with no changes made to
the authentication server. In this use case, the user installs a
SPARTAN user script in their browser. The user can then enter
a backslash (’\’) or another user-defined character into any
password field and the SPARTAN grid will appear on top of
the webpage. The user can then enter his SPARTAN password
in the grid, and the hashed version of this password will be
automatically placed in the website’s linear password field.
III. RELATED WORK
The topic of usable passwords has been a contentious
subject of research for many in the field of privacy and security
throughout the years. Among the participants in a study by
Mare et al., passwords were the most commonly disliked form
of authentication, and had a relatively high failure rate among
users [4]. Many other experts and studies find that current
password practices are burdensome to users [3]. However,
due to the deployability of passwords, among other factors,
passwords are here to stay [1][2].
Password managers can help solve the common user prob-
lem of having too many passwords to remember; however, a
study by Ion et al. found that many users are distrustful of
password managers and do not find them to be user-friendly
[5]. Furthermore, many organizations do not feel they can trust
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third-party password managers, and restrict their employees
from using them for work accounts [4].
A study by Shay et al. evaluated the tradeoff between
security and usability in user-created passwords made under
different length and complexity requirements [6]. Some studies
have suggested the use of randomly-chosen dictionary words
for passwords. A study by Cranor et al. found that computer-
generated passphrases made up of randomly-chosen dictionary
words are not any more memorable than computer-generated
short passwords, and the passphrases take longer to type (and
re-type if the user makes an error) [3]. In their work with
Persuasive Text Passwords (PTP), Forget et al. combined user-
and computer-generated passwords. PTP increases the security
of user-created passwords by placing random characters at
random positions in the password text. Their study found
that PTP is a promising method both in terms of usability
and security, but also discovered a limit where users would
create weaker initial passwords if PTP was too aggressive in
its transformations [7].
Mnemonic passwords, where users are instructed to make a
password by choosing a character for each word of a selected
phrase, have also been an interesting point of research. Kuo
et al. found that user-created mnemonic passwords are often
based on well-known phrases, such as song lyrics, and they
could be vulnerable to a specially-crafted dictionary attack [8].
A study by Forget et al. found that these password schemes
may be difficult for users to understand and are easy to misuse
[9].
Graphical passwords are another variation on normal pass-
word authentication that is currently in use on various mobile
and desktop platforms. During their study using the graphi-
cal password system PassTiles, Strobert and Biddle showed
that graphical passwords are easier for users to remember
than generated textual passwords [10]. However, they can
also be prone to predictability, and can even fall victim to
dictionary attacks [11][12] or the selection of ’hot-spots’ in
the chosen image [13]. Tao and Adams observed that users
create relatively long graphical passwords with their Pass-
Go interface, wherein users pick and connect intersections
on a grid rather than the conventional selection of grid cells.
Their research also shows a propensity for users to start in
predictable locations in the grid and to draw familar shapes
[14]. Chiasson et al. developed Persuasive Cued Click-Points
(PCCP) to aid users in selecting more random locations in a
graphical password, with significant success [15]. However,
many forms of graphical passwords also fall short when
compared to textual passwords because they must allow a
degree of tolerance in user input. Without this, users are often
unable to correctly enter their graphical passwords [16].
Safdar and Hassan suggest the completion of a full two-
dimensional grid as passwords in secure environments [17]. In
their research, they acknowledge that this method should only
be used in extreme situations where security is paramount,
because the passwords are too complex and lengthy for normal
users to remember.
Perhaps the most similar work to the research described in
this paper is Saharkar and Dhopte’s scheme for the combina-
tion of graphical and alphanumeric passwords. In their model,
they suggest that users should choose points of interest on an
image, and have the option of adding a textual password to
each point upon password entry [18]. As of this writing, there
is no published research evaluating the security or usability of
this method.
Our study is unique to all previous research in that it
evaluates the combination of aspects of graphical and linear
passwords. Although SPARTAN uses a two-dimensional grid,
it is different from Safdar and Hassan’s work in that its use
does not require users to complete the entire grid space. In
this way, our study gives unique insight into the creation of
passwords and is the first to evaluate the SPARTAN method
of authentication.
IV. METHOD
We conducted a Institutional Review Board (IRB)-approved
human factors study with adult employees of our organi-
zation in order to evaluate the usability of our SPARTAN
prototype and differences between user-created SPARTAN and
linear passwords. During the course of this study, we were
especially concerned with identifying usability limitations in
our SPARTAN prototype, identifying any potential patterns in
participant’s use of the prototype and comparing passwords
created with a linear password interface with those created
with the SPARTAN interface.
Participants were recruited via email and could participate at
their leisure from the comfort of their individual workstations.
Figures 2 and 3 show demographic information of participants
and their reported computer usage. The study took place over
the course of three weeks from late August to early September
2016.
A. Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to the control group
(linear passwords) or the experimental group (SPARTAN
passwords). Each group went through four phases: instruction,
creation, survey, and recall. The study had to be completed in
one session; users were not able to return to complete their
participation.
During instruction, the experimental group was given min-
imal instructions on SPARTAN and an interactive demo of its
use. In the creation phase, members of each group created
a password. For both SPARTAN and linear participants, the
only password requirement was that it comprise at least eight
characters. All passwords were masked during creation. In
addition to a password hash, we collected a converted version
of the passwords created which conveyed the character set
used for each character of the password (uppercase, lowercase,
numerical, or special character). This data allowed us to
determine the password length and number of character sets
used as well as the placement of SPARTAN passwords in the
grid.
After creating their passwords, all participants completed a
survey for demographic information and password practices.
3
Fig. 2. Participant-reported age and gender demographics. Notice that not
all participants completed the survey phase of the study, and they were not
required to answer questions to complete their participation. N=77
SPARTAN participants were asked additional questions about
the SPARTAN interface. Participants were then asked to recall
the password they created at the beginning of the study, with
the opportunity to retry as many times as desired.
Some participants did not complete all phases of the study;
user retention is discussed further in Section V-D1. Of the
participants that reached the recall phase, the median total time
spent on the study for members of the control group was 3.8
minutes, whereas in the experimental group the median time
was 13.7 minutes. Figure IV shows the average time spent in
each phase for all participants.
B. SPARTAN Prototype
The SPARTAN prototype used in this study is a 12x12
grid, with the block colorization seeded by the username used.
When entering a password, the user was expected to first
choose a starting location by clicking on a cell in the grid,
then choose a typing direction for their password by clicking
on an arrow or pressing an arrow on their keyboard. In order to
de-clutter the interface, we opted for arrows superimposed on
the grid itself instead of a separate directional pad (d-pad). As
a goal of this study was to gather data on where users would
independently place their passwords in the SPARTAN grid, we
refrained from giving a default grid location and direction.
We also implemented a mobile-inspired masking mecha-
nism, where characters in adjacent cells remain visible to the
user until the cursor is moved to a distant cell. Characters
in each cell could be unmasked by hovering over the desired
cell. A screenshot of the developed prototype displaying these
features is shown in Figure 5.
Fig. 3. Participant-reported computer usage: a) shows participants’ responses
to the question “How comfortable are you with using computers?” b) depicts
responses to “How much time on average do you spend on a computer on
work days?”, and c) shows the distribution of answers to the question “How
much time on average do you spend on a computer on non-work days?”.
N=77
Fig. 4. Average time spent by participants in each phase. ( ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p <
0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001 2-tailed t-test )
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Fig. 5. SPARTAN prototype used in the study, with overlaid arrows, grid
colorization, text wrapping, and mobile-style masking mechanisms.
Some of the design decisions made for the use of this study
were found to have adverse affects on the usability of the
prototype. These concerns are explained further in Section
V-B3.
Passwords created with the SPARTAN prototype were col-
lected by filling empty cells with spaces in order to effectively
preserve location data and concatenating each row to the
preceding rows. The result of the concatenation was then
hashed to compare against re-entered passwords.
V. RESULTS
A. Password Practices
During the survey phase, we asked all participants about
their password practices. When asked how often they forget
a password to one of their accounts, 49% of participants said
“Once or twice a month” or more often (N=77). When asked
how difficult it is to create a password that meets password
requirements, 55% of participants reported “slightly difficult”
or higher (N=77). When asked if they had any other comments,
suggestions, or opinions on password practices or other topics,
there was a mix of beliefs and security knowledge among
our participants. Some indicated that they are unsure of what
constitutes a secure password. Others stated that they use a
password manager to manage all of their passwords across
different accounts, while one stated that they write down their
passwords in order to keep track of them. Some participants
indicated that password complexity requirements is reaching
a level such that it is difficult to develop a scheme to keep
track of the different requirements and passwords across sites,
while several voiced their opinions that longer passwords, or
passphrases, offer more of a benefit against password crackers
than increased complexity requirements. A couple also cited
research that suggests enterprises should not mandate periodic
password changes. Another participant mentioned that they
wish biometrics, such as fingerprint scanners, could be adopted
more universally.
In general, our participants’ responses indicated that they
are burdened by password creation, with many sites enforcing
disparate complexity requirements. This is in line with other
research and expert opinions in the field [3][19][4]. Many
participants demonstrated an affinity for longer length require-
ments in place of complexity requirements. This is also the
opinion supported by the NIST Draft Digital Authentication
Guideline [20], and is the idea behind the SPARTAN interface,
to decrease complexity requirements while increasing security.
B. SPARTAN Usability
In this section we evaluate SPARTAN in terms of the
time required to use the SPARTAN interface, the rate of
recall of SPARTAN passwords, and the reported usability and
acceptance of SPARTAN among participants.
1) Time Considerations: As shown in Figure IV, the av-
erage time for participants to create a SPARTAN password
was three times that of their linear counterparts. In addition,
experimental group participants took approximately twice as
long as their control group counterparts to recall their pass-
words. Although this is a significant increase in time required
for creation and recall, we find these results promising as
the factor of increase decreased as participants became more
familiar with the SPARTAN interface. Future work should
further evaluate the time required for users to login using
SPARTAN after they’ve gained familiarity with the interface
over time.
2) Recall Rate: In total, 31 SPARTAN and 41 linear
participants reached the recall phase of the study. Of these
SPARTAN participants, three did not attempt to recall their
password. Both the control group and the experimental group
had one participant who was unable to recall his password
after several attempts. Of the participants that did sucessfully
recall their passwords, two in the control group and three in
the experimental group required multiple attempts. In both
groups, the average number of attempts among all successful
participants was 1.1. All participants in the study only had to
remember their passwords for a couple of minutes while they
completed the survey; however, it is promising that SPARTAN
group participants displayed a recall rate similar to their linear
counterparts. Future work should evaluate the recall rate of
SPARTAN passwords over a longer period of time, and when
multiple passwords need to be remembered across different
accounts.
3) User Reaction: We asked members of both groups “How
comfortable are you with the security of the password you
created during this study?”. A larger proportion of SPARTAN
participants reported being “extremely,” comfortable with the
security of their password (28%) than linear participants
(12%). Approximately an equivalent proportion of SPARTAN
and linear participants expressed some level of comfort with
their created password (72% of SPARTAN, 71% of linear,
N=36 and 41, respectively). Please refer to Figure 6 for this
data. In addition, a majority (78%) of SPARTAN participants
agreed with the statement “I think SPARTAN passwords are
more secure than traditional passwords,” while a smaller ma-
jority (56%) disagreed with the statement “I think SPARTAN
passwords are more memorable than traditional passwords”
(N=36).
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Fig. 6. Participants’ reported comfort with the password they created during the study. SPARTAN participants N=36, linear participants N=41. A greater
number of SPARTAN participants than linear participants expressed extreme comfort with the password they created for their study, while an almost equivalent
proportion of participants in each group expressed some positive level of comfort with their password.
We also asked SPARTAN participants if they would prefer
to use SPARTAN or traditional passwords in order to log
in to their bank accounts. 37% of users said they would
prefer SPARTAN while 63% reported they would prefer linear
(N=35). The reasons behind these answers varied. The major-
ity of participants in favor of SPARTAN cited improved secu-
rity as the reason for their preference. Some even mentioned
that they would prefer security over ease-of-use for important
credentials. A few also mentioned that they liked that they
could create a unique pattern that would be impossible for
others to guess. Of those in favor of linear passwords, a
majority cited poor prototype usability as the reason behind
their preference.
One of the most prevalent problems with usability was
caused by our decision to superimpose arrows on the grid
instead of featuring a separate d-pad. With this implemen-
tation, in order to move around the grid cell by cell, users
could either click a cell or use the directional arrows on the
keyboard to navigate. However, if a cell contained an arrow,
one click would select the arrow, and a second click would
select the cell. This was understandably confusing to users un-
familiar with the mechanics. Our decision to eliminate default
selections also resulted in poor usability. As noted in Section
IV-B, in order to decrease bias, we did not implement a default
starting position or direction in the SPARTAN interface. This
resulted in a decrease in usability which would not be present
in a deployed system. In Section VIII, we propose future work
to improve the usability of SPARTAN.
The next most frequent response in favor of linear pass-
words was a feeling that SPARTAN passwords would be
harder to remember. As discussed in Section V-B2, we did
not see a significant decrease in recall rate for SPARTAN
passwords. However, our study only required a short amount of
time between password creation and recall; future work should
evaluate the recall rate of SPARTAN passwords over a longer
period of time. A few participants indicated their preference
was due to password managers not yet supporting SPARTAN
passwords.
C. SPARTAN Passwords
The increased security of SPARTAN passwords over linear
passwords depends on the variability of their placement in
Fig. 7. Heatmap of SPARTAN passwords created by participants. N=38
the grid. If all users choose the same location or set of
locations, the security of SPARTAN passwords would decrease
and SPARTAN would not provide any additional security
over linear passwords. The data gathered during our study
shows that users did choose variable password locations and
strategies throughout the grid, and increased the security of
their passwords by doing so. Figure 7 shows the distribution
of filled cells in the grid for all SPARTAN passwords created
by users.
In order to evaluate the types of passwords created by
users, we divided them into five different categories: Straight
Line, Snake, Block, Segments, and Points. Straight Line
passwords are those that continued in a straight line through
the grid. These could be horizontal, vertical, or diagonal.
Snake passwords are those that comprise adjacent cells but can
change direction any number of times as they travel through
the grid. Block passwords were usually created by a user
filling in all of the cells of a certain color block; Segment
passwords occurred when the user divided their password
into a number of Straight Line segments and placed those
segments in disjoint cells of the grid. Point passwords are
those where the user chose to place each character of their
passwords in disjoint cells across the grid. An example of
each type of password is given in Figure 1. The number of
each type of password created during this study is given in
Figure 8. While the largest proportion of participants created
Straight Line passwords, we were surprised to find that no
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Fig. 8. Categorization of participants’ SPARTAN passwords created during
the study. N=38
single type of password was created by a majority of users.
In addition, of the 17 Straight Line passwords created in this
study, eleven were horizontal, while two were vertical and four
diagonal. Snake passwords had an average of 2.7 direction
changes, and Segment passwords comprised an average of 2.3
segments. These are promising metrics as they show that users
will make a variety of SPARTAN passwords that cannot be
easily predicted.
D. Limitations
There are a number of factors that could have affected the
outcome of our study. Members of the experimental group
took much longer to complete their participation than members
of the control group. This could have led to fatigue in the
experimental group.
As mentioned in Section IV-B, in order to refrain from
imposing bias on the location and direction of participants’
SPARTAN passwords, we did not give a default location or
direction in the grid. This led to some usability concerns
among participants.
Finally, participants may have created stronger passwords
than they normally employ because they knew the passwords
were being monitored for a study. This is especially true in
the control group, as some participants indicated a belief that
the results of the study would be used to influence password
complexity requirements for our organization as a whole.
1) Retention: Although we recruited 100 participants from
throughout our organization, not all participants finished all
phases of the study. Two participants each from the control
and experimental groups quit after failing to create a password
due to being unable to meet requirements and/or re-enter the
password correctly. Since the same number of participants in
each group did this, terminating at this time should not be
attributed to difficulty with the SPARTAN interface.
It should also be noted that a number of participants from
each group quit before the survey loaded. We found during the
study that the survey had difficulty handling a large number
of simultaneous participants. A number of experimental group
participants also quit during the survey or before attempting
to recall their password. This may have been due to fatigue; as
noted in Section IV-A, participation in the experimental group
Fig. 9. Number of participants in each phase of study.
took much longer than control group participation did. More
information about the number of participants at each phase is
shown in Figure 9.
VI. PASSWORD CRACKING
During our study, we researched how an adversary would
attempt to crack SPARTAN passwords offline. None of the
open-source password cracking tools we tried were able to
crack SPARTAN passwords off-the-shelf, for two reasons.
First, SPARTAN passwords are simply too long for the
password crackers. These tools were developed to work on
relatively short linear passwords, and the source code would
have to be edited to accept SPARTAN passwords. Second,
they are not designed to expect the sparseness of SPARTAN
passwords. Since each empty cell was replaced with a space
in the password, even if a user used a dictionary word as
his password, the password would be hashed with additional
spaces present. The password cracking tool would need to
be updated to compute all of the possible permutations of
SPARTAN, such as starting in each location in the grid, being
typed in each direction, etc.
If SPARTAN were deployed in an organization, attackers
would readily update password cracking tools to work with
the differently-formatted SPARTAN passwords. This tasking
was outside the scope of this project and would make for
interesting follow-on work. However, cracking a SPARTAN
password would still require more effort from an attacker
than cracking a linear one. The major costs to attackers who
use password cracking tools in an offline stolen password
file attack are space required to store the dictionary and the
amount of time needed to calculate and search through the
hashes. Both of these factors are proportional to the number
of hashes to compute and sort through. Memory is relatively
cheap, and a higher number of computations can be defeated
by more time or higher computing power. However, this is
true for linear passwords as well. Even if all user-created
SPARTAN passwords were input horizontally from left to
right, this would still increase the dictionary and the number
of hashes to search through by a factor of 144 for a 12x12
grid. This increase could still be defeated with time, but its
significance is not negligible. On the other end of the spectrum,
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Fig. 10. Percent of SPARTAN Straight Line and Snake passwords created
beginning in each quadrant of the grid and percent of SPARTAN Straight
Line and Snake passwords beginning at the edges versus the center of the
grid. N=27
if all users created Point SPARTAN passwords, this would
increase the dictionary and the number of hashes to search
through by a factor of 2.78E+21 for 10 character passwords in
a 12x12 grid. The computational increase for this is significant
and could make a huge impact on security. There are many
forms of SPARTAN passwords between these two bounds,
and the comparative overall security of SPARTAN over linear
passwords is discussed in the following sections.
VII. DISCUSSION
Due to the predictability of user-created passwords, many
experts in the field assert that length may be the most important
factor in the security of linear passwords [20][6]. One curious
data point gathered during this study is that most SPARTAN
passwords comprised fewer characters than linear passwords.
The median length of a SPARTAN password created during
this study comprised 9 characters, while the median linear
password length was 11 characters. However, SPARTAN pass-
word locations varied, and this added location factor increases
the overall security of SPARTAN passwords over that of the
linear passwords. There are many ways to estimate the security
of a user-created password; a few of them are discussed here
for comparison.
One drawback to the design of our study is that we only
gathered the end result of password creation. Therefore, while
we have the locations of all SPARTAN passwords, we must
make some assumptions about which were the starting and
ending points of the passwords. Using the mechanics of the
prototype and previous work in the field demonstrating that
users tend to create graphical passwords that create a top-
down, left-right pattern [10], we made reasonable assumptions
about starting location for each Straight Line and Snake
password created and developed Figure 10, illustrating the
occurance of starting locations in each section of the grid.
While users often favored the first quadrant or the edges of the
grid as a starting location for their password, these areas did
not gain a majority of users, and many created more complex
passwords with less predictable starting points.
A. Predicting the Next Cell
Password security is commonly measured in terms of en-
tropy. Previous work in the field has tested the validity of
this and other measures in relation to actual password security
against realistic attacks [21][22][23]. We find the calculation
of entropy added by the use of SPARTAN to be an interesting
point of discussion for this research. Shannon’s work in which
he estimated the entropy of a string of English text has been
used in password security research for decades [24]. The 2013
NIST Electronic Authentication Guideline builds on Shannon’s
work and offers similar metrics for the entropy of passwords
[25]. In their analysis, the first character of a password is worth
4 bits of entropy. The following seven characters are worth 2
bits each, while characters 9 through 20 are each worth 1.5
bits. Each character after the twentieth is worth 1 bit each.
Using these metrics, the median-length linear password created
during this study was worth 23 bits of entropy and the median
SPARTAN password text was worth 20 bits of entropy.
However, this does not take into account the added security
provided by the variability of the location of SPARTAN
passwords in the grid. Following a similar method, we created
a formula for the effective entropy of each successive cell used
in a SPARTAN password. Using the data collected from the
SPARTAN passwords created during this study, we estimated 5
bits of entropy for the first cell chosen by the user. The entropy
decreases to 2.5 bits for the second cell, due to the increased
likelihood that the user selects a cell adjacent to the first. Cells
3 through 12 are each worth 1 bit of entropy, and any cell after
the twelfth does not provide any additional entropy, due to the
likelihood that it will follow a pattern shown in the previous
cells. This cell entropy can be added to the entropy of the
text of the password itself. Using these calculations, Figure 11
shows the comparable entropy for human-created linear and
SPARTAN passwords of varying lengths. As the graph shows,
a 6-character random linear password has 40 bits of entropy,
which is approximately equivalent to an 11-character user-
created SPARTAN password, or a 24-character user-created
linear password. A randomly-generated SPARTAN password
reaches 40 bits of entropy after just three characters. Thus,
using SPARTAN cuts the number of characters the user has to
type and remember in half, while maintaining an equivalent
amount of security in terms of entropy.
B. Dictionary Size
It is difficult to quantify exactly how bits of entropy corre-
late to increased security. Entropy can also be described as a
function of the dictionary size, or space (S) and the likelihood
(L) that a given password will be in the stated space, as in
Equation 1 below [26].
Entropy = log2(S/2L) (1)
Looking at the problem from this angle, one can consider the
number of passwords that an attacker might recover using a
given dictionary, as described in Section VI. An attacker will
try to go after the weakest passwords first when constructing
his dictionary. Assume the adversary has created a dictionary
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Fig. 11. Bits of entropy for lengths of user-generated linear and SPARTAN passwords and randomly-generated linear and SPARTAN passwords.
of 5000 possible passwords and assume he is able to crack all
linear passwords comprising a maximum of 10 characters with
this dictionary. Under these assumptions, he would recover
43% of the linear passwords created in our study.
Using the same dictionary, but adapting it to look for
SPARTAN passwords that are up to 10 characters and that
start at the top left corner of the grid and continue horizontally,
the dictionary would have the same number of entries, but the
adversary would only recover 5% of the passwords created
with SPARTAN. Although a greater number of SPARTAN
passwords were 10 characters or fewer, only 5% of the SPAR-
TAN passwords created were both 10 characters or fewer and
placed horizontally in the top left corner. Thus, with the same
size dictionary (therefore the same number of comparisons to
perform, the same amount of time spent cracking), the attacker
would only recover 5% of the SPARTAN passwords created
in this study compared to 43% of the linear passwords.
The attacker could increase his dictionary to include all
Straight Line horizontal passwords of 10 characters or fewer
placed anywhere in the grid. By doing so, his dictionary would
now be able to recover 29% of the SPARTAN passwords
created in this study, but his dictionary would necessarily
increase by a factor of 288 for a 12x12 grid (passwords could
start anywhere in the grid, traveling left or right). This trend
continues for other common SPARTAN password placements.
The attacker could alter his dictionary to target a certain subset
of SPARTAN passwords, but this comes with the tradeoff of a
larger dictionary, thus more memory and time required. Figure
12 displays the calculated tradeoff between dictionary size for
the more common variations of SPARTAN passwords and the
percent of passwords recovered.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
During this user study, we created a SPARTAN prototype,
gathered empirical data on the security and usability of this
method, and analyzed SPARTAN password security. The pro-
totype interface, while sufficiently usable for the purposes
of this study, would benefit from focused improvement to
maximize usability. The usability concerns voiced by users
were largely against the particular implementation of SPAR-
TAN created for this study, and participants were open to
new methods of authentication. Many users voiced opinions
showing that they are overburdened with the current state
of password requirements employed in their various online
accounts, and they showed that they are interested in trying
new forms of authentication.
The user-created SPARTAN passwords in this study, while
generally shorter than the linear passwords created by partici-
pants, varied in placement throughout the grid and demonstrate
that SPARTAN is a promising method for shorter, more secure
passwords. In addition, current password cracking tools are
not capable of breaking SPARTAN passwords without mod-
ification, and SPARTAN would necessitate the use of larger
dictionaries than those employed for cracking linear passwords
to recover the same number of user-created passwords.
There is still much work that can be done to evaluate the
security and usability of SPARTAN passwords. First, we would
like to address some of the usability concerns mentioned by
participants in this study. In future deployments, we would
like to employ a default location and direction in the grid in
order to ease usability. In addition, we would like to introduce
a simpler d-pad implementation for the directional arrows
instead of superimposed arrows on the grid. We would also
like to look into mobile adoption, as we can see usability on
mobile as an important feature going forward.
We gathered 38 SPARTAN and 44 linear passwords during
this study. In the future, we would like to gather more data on
user-created SPARTAN passwords to ensure that the trends we
saw in this study hold with a larger sample size. In addition,
we would like to conduct a study to gain insight into the
optimal grid size and layout to balance the tradeoffs among
usability, memorability, and security. The decreased security
resulting from the use of a smaller grid (10x10 or 8x8, for
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Fig. 12. Tradeoff between dictionary size and percent of passwords recovered for various methods of attack.
example) could perhaps be tolerated if increased usability
can be demonstrated. Finally, we would like to conduct a
study to gather data on the usability of SPARTAN over time,
while participants use it to authenticate periodically over the
course of a few months. This study would gain data on the
memorability of SPARTAN and its usability over time, and
could incorporate activities related to SPARTAN password
changes and recovery for analysis.
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